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This paper develops a model of weight assignments using a pseudo-Bayesian approach that 
reflects investors’ behavioral biases. In this parsimonious model of investor sentiment, weights 
induced by investors’ conservative and representative heuristics are assigned to observations of 
the earning shocks of stock prices. Such weight assignments enable us to provide a quantitative 
link between some market anomalies and investors’ behavioral biases. The seriousness of an 
anomaly can be quantitatively assessed by investigating into its dependency on weights. New 
results other than the short- run overreaction and long-run overreaction can be derived and new 
hypotheses can be formed.   
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1.   INTRODUCTION 
Among many market anomalies uncovered in the last two decades, three stand out as having a 
long history and receiving the most substantial empirical support. They are market excess 
volatility, overreaction, and underreaction. Together with other market anomalies, they pose a 
major challenge to financial economists. To meet these challenges, advocates of behavioral 
biases have constructed various behavioral models to explain these anomalies. Among the 
behavioral biases advocated, two also stand out as having a long history and receiving much 
empirical supports from psychological literatures. These behavioral biases are investors’ usage of 
the conservatism heuristics and the representativeness heuristics in making decisions. The most 
notable model in this direction is an early paper by Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny (1998, 
henceforth BSV), in which they show that underreaction in the short-run and overreaction in the 
long-run is a consequence of the two mentioned heuristics. However, their paper did not show 
that excess volatility is also a result of the conservatism and representativeness heuristics. 
BSV adopt a bounded rationalism approach in which some, but not all, assumptions under the 
traditional rational expectations asset-pricing theory are violated. Specifically, the “consistent 
beliefs” made by Sargent (1993) that agents possess correct knowledge of the economic structure 
is assumed to be violated. In their 1998 paper, BSV assume that while earning announcements 
follow a random walk, investors using conservative and representative heuristics believe that the 
earning announcements fall into one of two regimes, a trending regime and a mean reverting 
regime, and transition from one regime to the other follows a Markov chain. Assuming that the 
investors still use a correct Bayesian methodology for decision making, BSV then deduce that   3
such a wrong belief will lead to both short-term underreaction and long-term overreaction in the 
market.  
This paper takes a different approach from that of BSV in modeling conservatism and 
representativeness. We assume that the investor knows the correct model but uses a wrong 
updating methodology. This approach has several advantages as follows: (1) psychological 
literature clearly states that the two psychological biases arise from investors’ attaching wrong 
weights to information, rather than from their adoption of a wrong model. In this paper, the 
weighting of information is emphasized and it is a more accurate description of the heuristics 
used by investors. (2) Since the wrong weights reflect the biases, different degree of biases can 
be assessed through considering a change in weights. As a result, the seriousness of an anomaly 
can be quantitatively assessed by investigating into its dependency on weights.   (3) New results 
other than the short- run overreaction and long-run overreaction can be derived and new 
hypotheses can be formed.  We will elaborate on these points below. 
Let us elaborate on (1). According to DeBondt and Thaler (1995), a good finance theory must be 
based on psychological evidence of how people actually behave. Thus it is important to look into 
the psychological literature on how the behavioral biases arise. Psychologists observe that 
investors pay too much attention to extreme information and less attention to its validity when 
making judgments and decisions about their investments (Griffin and Tversky 1992). When 
investors are overconfident about their analysis based on the past performance of stocks and 
underreact to recent information, thus updating their beliefs too slowly in the face of new 
evidence, they exhibit conservative heuristics (Edwards 1968; Grether 1980). On the other hand, 
if they are overconfident about the recent information on stocks and pay less attention to the past   4
information on stocks or extrapolate too readily from small samples, thus leading to belief 
revisions that are too dramatic, they demonstrate representative heuristics (Tversky and 
Kahneman 1971, 1974; Kahneman and Tversky 1973). Most studies of conservative heuristics 
involve large samples, whereas most studies on representative heuristics involve smaller samples. 
Misunderstanding the impact of sample size on the posterior mean leads investors to make 
conservative revisions with large samples and radical revisions with small samples. Thus it is 
obvious that behavioral biases arise from an inappropriate treatment of information, rather than 
from a misjudgment on the model. 
One of the earliest papers addressing conservatism is Edwards (1968), who reveals that people 
tend to make behavioral mistakes in their decisions, although they try to employ theoretical 
models or methodology. He observes that investors with conservative behavior might pay little 
attention or even ignore the full information from an earnings announcement. They may believe 
that this information is mainly temporary, and thus they still cling to their prior beliefs based on 
past earnings. As a result, they might incorporate only partial information from recent earnings 
announcement in their valuation of shares. In other words, they attach too little a weight to recent 
information. Edwards (1968) develops a Bayesian model in which individuals tend to 
underweigh useful statistical evidence relative to the less useful evidence used to form their 
priors. He observes that it takes two to five observations to do one observation’s worth of work 
in inducing a subject to change his opinions. Grether (1980) claims that individuals who exhibit 
conservatism update their beliefs too slowly in the face of new evidence. Klein (1990), 
Mendenhall (1991) and Abarbanell and Bernard (1992) further suggest that investors tend to 
underreact to new information. In terms of the Bayesian rule, conservatism means that people   5
tend to overweigh the base rate (prior) and underweigh new information.  This is exactly the 
approach of the proposed model in this paper.  
On the representative heuristic, many experiments (see, for example, DeBondt and Thaler 1985; 
Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny 1994; Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny 1998)] show that 
individuals expect key population parameters to be “represented” in any recent sequence of 
generated data (see Tversky and Kahneman 1971, 1974 for a detailed discussion). Tversky and 
Kahneman (1971) suggest that local representativeness is a belief in the “law of small numbers,” 
meaning that “the law of large numbers applies to small numbers as well.” Investors may find 
that even small samples (rather than large samples) are highly representative of the populations 
from which they are drawn. This simply shows that investors may place excessive weights on a 
sample of small size and neglect distinct information unjustifiably. The model proposed in this 
paper adopts this approach in modeling the law of small sample and in fact, the “smallness” of 
the sample will be taken into account in our model. 
On point (2), we remark that some key measures of market anomalies like market volatility, 
autocorrelation of market returns, trading profit of a self-finance long-short strategy etc, can be 
expressed in terms of the weights and key financial variables like risk free interest rates. The 
impact of the incorrect weights on the anomalous magnitudes can hence be quantitatively 
assessed. In so doing, we can compare the impact of conservatism and representativeness on the 
anomalous magnitudes. We can also study the interaction between the heuristics and the key 
financial variable. For example, we can show that market’s excess volatility is essentially the 
result of the “law of small number”, and under a reasonable assumption on smallness, volatility   6
can become 28 times that of the volatility attributable to pure information, see Section III for 
further details. 
On point (3), our behavioral model gives rise to a richer body of consequences than BSV. Other 
than demonstrating short-run underreaction and long-run overreaction, we also derive excess 
volatility as a consequence of the behavioral model. Furthermore, we can attribute the excess 
volatility to the representative heuristic and show that excess volatility is more prominent when 
the discount rate is small. On overreaction and underreaction, we demonstrate that there exists a 
magnitude effect in the under- and overreaction phenomena. Specifically, our model provide 
theoretical support for the second part of the under- and overreaction hypotheses. Recall that the 
first part of the overreaction (underreaction) hypothesis in DeBondt and Thaler (1985) 
(Jegadeesh and Titman 1993) is “extreme movements in stock prices will be followed by 
subsequent price movements in the opposite (same) direction” and the second part of the 
overreaction (underreaction) hypothesis is “the more extreme the initial price movement, the 
greater will be the subsequent adjustment”. In other words, if n   pieces of good/bad news 
announcements repeatedly occur n times, the overreaction that results increases with n. Not only 
we can show that the autocorrelation magnitude and the trading profit increase with n , our 
model actually shows that these anomalous magnitudes are a convex function of n . Another 
consequence we can draw from the model is that the trading profit of the contrarian/momentum 
trading strategy increases when discount rate decreases.   
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we construct a pseudo-Bayesian 
framework to model investors’ conservative and representative heuristics and develop price 
dynamics under this model. In Section III, we study how the heuristics will impact on market   7
volatility in equilibrium. We then outline in Section IV the implications of our proposed model 
by using it to demonstrate the existence of short-run underreaction and long-run overreaction in 
the stock market. The trading profit resulting from the corresponding momentum/ contrarian 
trading strategies is also derived and analyzed. In Section V, we show that our model enables us 
to derive an additional result that there is a “magnitude effect” associated with the under-and-
overreaction in the stock market. We show further that the magnitude effect is convex in nature. 
Section VI wraps up this paper with a conclusion. Some proofs are provided in the appendices. 
2.   THE MODEL 
                 In BSV, a representative investor observes the earnings of an asset and updates his 
belief to price the asset. It is assumed that  t N , the earnings announcement of the asset at time t, 
follows a random walk, i.e.,  t t t y N N + = −1  where  t y  is an earnings shock at time t. Using a 
discounting model, the asset is priced at time t as  t P  given by 
12 1 2
21 2
1
1( 1 ) ( 1 ) ( 1 )
tt t t t t t
tt
NN N E y E y r
PE
rr r r r r
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           (1) 
where  r   is the discount rate or the investor’s anticipated return. In (1),  t E  represents  the 
investor’s expectation given the information set  t Φ , which is the set of all information available 
to the investor at time t. In BSV, the following assumptions are made:  
Assumption 1: The earnings shock  t y   is independent and follows a distribution with equal 
chance on discrete values  0 y o r   0 y − .    8
Assumption 2: The representative agent does not realize that the true process for earnings 
follows a random walk and uses a wrong model to update his or her beliefs. She or he assumes 
that the earnings shock  t y   transit between two regimes (or states) of a Markov chain: a 
momentum regime and a reversal regime. The transition probability (from  0 y t o   0 y −  or from 
0 y −  to  0 y ) is small (smaller than one-half) in the momentum regime and is large (larger than 
one-half) in the reversal regime. 
Assumption 3: The representative agent uses a correct Bayesian approach to update his or her 
beliefs. In other words, the agent estimates the current state of the earnings shocks and uses 
them to determine the future expected price. 
Notice that in (1),  t E   is the expectation taken under assumptions 1, 2 and 3. Hence, it 
incorporates the investor’s biased views toward pricing, as a result of a model mis-specification 
in assumption 2. Under these biased views, BSV deduce that both short-run underreaction and 
long-run overreaction exist. Notice that under-and-overreaction occur as a result of the investor’s 
mis-specification of the model and not from his or her biased updating methods. In this paper, we 
propose an alternative approach by assuming that the representative investor is aware of the 
correct underlying model but fails to adopt a correct approach in the updating process. Brav and 
Heaton (2002) is the first paper to model an investor as one who misapplies Bayesian 
methodology. However, they model the representative heuristic only. In this paper, we further 
extend their incorrect Bayesian method to also include the conservative heuristic. Specifically, 
BSV’s assumptions are modified as follows:   9
Assumption 1’: The earning  t N  follows a random walk model but the earnings shock,  t y,  i s  
independent and follows a Gaussian distribution with mean µ  and variance 
2
y σ .  
Assumption 2’: The representative agent knows the nature of the random walk process, except 
that the parameter µ  in the model has to be estimated. In other words, the agent has to estimate 
the mean µ   by employing observed data on the earnings shock{} t y . For simplicity and 
tractability, we also assume that the representative agent knows 
2
y σ  and adopts a vague prior for 
µ .  
Assumption 3’: The agent uses a wrong statistical method to update his or her belief. It is the 
wrong method that reflects the investor’s behavioral biases.  
In BSV, the expectation  t E  incorporates investor’s assessments of the future based on a wrong 
model. Under the new assumptions,  t E  incorporates investors’ biases not as the result of a mis-
specification of the model but as a result of an incorrect updating method. In this paper, the 
subjective expectation  i t t y E +   reflects investors’ conservative and representative heuristics in 
estimating the parameter µ . The term  i t t y E +  can be explicitly computed after we describe the 
pseudo-Bayesian approach in detail in the following subsections. 
2.1   Modeling Behavioral Biases by a Pseudo-Bayesian Approach 
1. A quantitative behavioral model with general weights 
  Before we present the pseudo-Bayesian approach adopted by a behaviorally biased investor, we 
first describe the correct methodology to update information on the mean level µ  of the earnings   10
shock. We assume a vague prior for µ , i.e.  0() P µ   1 ∝  [see DeGroot (1970)]. Let  i y  be the 
earnings shock observed at the end of period i ,  t i ,..., 2 , 1 = . Since the likelihood function is 
given by 
() () ∏
=
+ − =
t
i
i t y L L
1
1 µ µ , 
the posterior distribution of µ  is given as follows:  
() () 1 , ,
1
1 1 ⋅ ∝ ⋅⋅ ⋅ ∏
=
+ −
t
i
i t t y L y y P µ µ .                       ( 2 )  
Notice that equal weight is placed on each observation in  1,, t yy    under the Bayesian approach. 
Consistent with the predictions of traditional efficient markets, this rational expectations asset-
pricing theory assumes that investors can have access both to the correct specification of the 
“true” economic model and to unbiased estimators of its coefficients; see, for example, Friedman 
(1979) for more information. Obviously, if the rational investor is endowed with an objectively 
correct prior and the correct likelihood functions, he/she will obtain the rational expectations 
equilibrium and thus any structural irrationally induced financial anomaly should disappear. 
Attainment of such structural knowledge on convergence to a rational expectations solution has 
been studied widely in the literature. For example, Blume and Easley (1982) and Bray and Kreps 
(1987) observe that investors have to recognize and incorporate how their beliefs  about the 
unknown essential features of the economy influence the structural model of the economy. 
However, the extreme knowledge required in these models is implausible. If investors do not 
recognize the effect of learning on prices to obtain equilibrium, Blume and Easley (1982) have 
shown that convergence of beliefs is not guaranteed within a general equilibrium learning model.    11
Nonetheless, as evidence has mounted against this traditional Bayesian model, theories of 
financial anomalies have to be developed by relaxing those assumptions. One approach is to 
assume that investors are plagued with cognitive biases (Slovic 1972), and they may incorrectly 
assign different weights to different observations. To model such behavioral biases, we assume 
that they place weight  1 ω   on the most recent observation t y ,  2 ω   on the second most recent 
observation 1 t y − , and so on, with the possibility that  i w ’s may not equal to 1. In other words, we 
modify the likelihood function as  
                                                      () () 1
1
i t
ti
i
LL y
ω
µ µ −+
=
=∏ .                         ( 3 )  
The posterior distribution then becomes 
                                              () () 11
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i
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As a result, the posterior mean and posterior variance of the unknown mean can be obtained and 
the price dynamic under the behavioral model can be summarized in the following proposition: 
Proposition 1    (Price dynamic under a pseudo-Bayesian approach).  
1) Under a pseudo-Bayesian approach with a vague prior and an incorrect likelihood  () L µ  as 
stated in (3), for any  1 k ≥  the posterior mean 
S
tt k Ey +  and posterior variance 
2
t σ  of µ  become 
                                 
t
t t
k t t s
y y
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respectively where 
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2)   The price at time t using the rational expectations pricing model in (1) becomes  
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t
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Proof:  Since the exact likelihood for the observation  i y  is given by  
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  The pseudo likelihood in (3) becomes  
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Thus, an investor loaded with cognitive biases will adopt the posterior mean and posterior 
variance as stated in (5). Substituting the expression of conditional mean in (5) into (1) results in 
expression (6). This completes the proof of Proposition 1.   13
2. Weight assignment schemes to reflect cognitive biases 
In the model above, we incorporate general weights on observations into a simple asset-pricing 
setup. This allows us to examine the price formation process under a rational expectations 
approach with biased weights. This approach enables practitioners and academics to compare 
ways in which investors, with or without cognitive biases, incorporate their prior beliefs into the 
historical data to estimate valuation-relevant parameters that can lead to anomalous asset-price 
behavior. We note that the idea of using different weights on evidences is not new in the finance 
literature. For example, Brav and Heaton (2002) consider weights given by 
1
2
1
2
1,
0.
t
tt
ω ω
ωω
+
= ==
= ==
 
 
 
Under this weighting scheme, investors simply ignore the distant half of the available data. Also, 
it is common in the psychological literature to assume that investors calculate the posterior mean, 
which is a weighted average rather than a simple average as suggested by a correct Bayesian 
approach. In this paper, we use a more general assumption that investors may use weights, 
12 ,, ω ω  , satisfying  0 1 i ω ≤ ≤  for all i. By allowing more flexibility in the choice of weights, 
investors’ various behavioral biases can be represented quantitatively. Specifically, in (A), (B), 
and (C) below, we spell out three weight assignment schemes to characterize the conservative 
and/ or representative heuristics.  
(A) Investors using a conservative heuristic assign weights as:    
00 12 1 01 nn ω ωω ω + ≤<<< = ==    ,   14
(B) investors using a representative heuristic assign weights as:  
00 0 12 1 2 10 mm m ω ωω ω ω ++ ==== > > >≥    , and 
(C) investors using both conservative and representative heuristics  assign weights as: 
00 0 0 12 1 1 01 0 nn m m ω ωω ω ωω ++ ≤<<< = == = > >≥      . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1A. Weights (wi ) assigned to evidence i-days ago for an investor using 
conservatism heuristics  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1B. Weights (wi ) assigned to evidence i-days ago for an investor using 
representativeness heuristics 
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Figure 1C. Weights (wi ) assigned to evidence i-days ago for an investor using 
conservatism heuristics conservatism and representativeness heuristics 
 
 
For a graphical representation of the weights used by the conservative investors, see Figure 1A. 
Note that the weight assignment scheme of 
0 12 1 n ω ωω < << =    is  consistent  with  the 
psychological literature on conservative heuristics as reviewed in the introduction. Basically, 
people are overconservative in that they underweigh recent information and overweigh prior 
information. The parameter  0 n   reflects the conservative heuristic that most recent  0 n  
observations are underweighted. If Edwards (1968) is right in that it takes two to five 
observations to do one observation’s worth of work in inducing a subject to change his opinions, 
1 ω ,  2 ω ,…, 
0 n ω can be substantially less than 1 for  0 5 n ≤ . The smaller are the weights, the more 
conservative are the investors. Thus, the magnitudes of the weights  1 ω ,  2 ω ,…, 
0 n ω  can be used 
to measure the degree of conservatism. The evidence suggests that underreaction reflects the 
uncertainty regarding possible structural change in the data and a lack of knowledge that a 
change occurred. This will result in a failure to fully incorporate the price implications of this 
change into the estimation of the valuation-relevant parameters.  
wi 
i   16
For a graphical representation of the weights used by the investor with the representative 
heuristic, see Figure 1B. Note that the weight assignment in Scheme B is consistent with the 
psychological literature on the representative heuristic, as reviewed in the introduction. The 
representative heuristic in behavioral finance is often described as the tendency of experimental 
subjects to overweigh recent clusters of observations and underweigh older observations that 
would otherwise moderate beliefs. Heavy weights on recent data could be a reaction to concern 
with structural change. Whenever such change occurs, the weight placed on recent data will be 
very high or similarly the weight placed on the older data will be very low, which will result in a 
pattern of overreaction caused by the representative heuristic. The representative heuristic is 
characterized by a parameter  0 m showing that the investor underweight the observations beyond 
the most recent  0 m  data points. Here, the parameter  0 m  arises from the “law of small numbers” 
(Tversky and Kahneman 1971) in the mind of the investor. Because of their representative 
heuristic, investors have the tendency to treat a small sample size, like  0 m , as large enough to 
represent the whole population. So, they assign weights much smaller than 1 for observations 
beyond the most recent  0 m  observations. Put differently, the weights 
0 1 m ω + , 
0 2 m ω + … are assigned 
to be much smaller than 1. Also, we assume here that 
1 o
i
im
ω
∞
=+
< ∞ ∑  because if the sum equals to 
infinity, the law of large numbers is still at work. For a genuine belief in the law of small 
numbers, the sum should be finite, meaning that the small sample of the most recent observations 
can play an overwhelming role in the inference process.  
Our model formulation asserts that investors are influenced by the conservative and 
representativeness heuristics simultaneously. This is different from the formulation in BSV in 
which investors are under the influence of one heuristic and then suddenly shift to another   17
regime of being influenced by the other heuristic. In other word, conservatism and 
representativeness are not mutually exclusive and investors can be simultaneously influenced by 
both heuristics at any point in time. A graphical representation of the weights used by investors 
with both heuristics is displayed in Fig 1c. When the investor is under the influence of both 
heuristics, the model has two parameters  o n  and  o m  as described above. Here, conservatism is 
reflected by the existence of  0 o n >   and the smallness of the sum  1 1 0− + ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ + n ω ω , and 
representativeness is reflected by the existence of  ∞ < o m   and the smallness of the sum 
⋅ ⋅ ⋅ + + + 2 1 0 0 m m ω ω .  
Notice that a type (C) investors degenerate into a type (A) investors when  0 m =∞ and 
degenerate into a type (B) investors when  0 0 n =  . Also when  ∞ = 0 m  and  0 0 = n , all weights 
are equal to 1 and the investor has no behavioral bias. In this sense, the third type of investor 
embraces all other types. Thus, it suffices to consider investors of the third type. To fully 
understand the price anomalies that will be introduced when incorrect weights are assigned to the 
likelihood function, we investigate its implication to market volatility in Section III and 
investigate its implications for under- and overreaction in Sections IV and V. 
3.   MODEL’S IMPLICATIONS FOR EXCESS VOLATILITY 
3.1 Market volatility under the behavioral model 
Since volatility in the market is one of the most interesting aspects of finance theory, in this 
section, we study the magnitude of market volatility under our behavioral model. Under our 
behavioral model with mis-specified weights i ω ’s, the asset price  t P  measured in a log-scale    18
follows a stochastic process given by (6) in which the earnings  i y ’s are i.i.d. 
2 (, ) N µ σ  random 
variables as stated in Assumption 1’. Similarly, the price,  1 + t P , at  1 + t  can be expressed as  
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Thus, the 1-period return,  t t t t P P R − = + + 1 1 , , from time t to time  1 + t  is given by  
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Hence, its variance can be expressed as  
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3.2 Market volatility at equilibrium 
Notice that when t  is small, the investor is still learning about the economic structure. The 
learning process becomes complete when t gets large. Since we want to distinguish whether the 
excess volatility is contributed by learning or by behavioral biases, we study the equilibrium 
situation when t   tends to infinity. We adopt this same treatment when we study over- and 
underreaction in the later sections as well. 
When  t s →∞ as t →∞, one can show that  ()
2
2 1 ,
1
lim y t t t r
R Var σ = + ∞ →  (see Appendix 1), which 
can be regarded as the basic volatility due to information uncertainty. It is intuitive that   19
information uncertainty is a determinant of price volatility because the information process  t N  is 
a random walk, and hence, past information will have a permanent price effect. Thus, the most 
recent earnings shock  t y , with a variance equal to 
2
y σ , will induce volatility in prices. In 
addition to information uncertainty, volatility may arise because of investors’ uncertainty about 
the values of the valuation-relevant parameters. However, as  ∞ → t , more information is 
accumulated, and parameters can be estimated with greater accuracy if we assume that  ∞ → t s  . 
As a consequence, under the condition that  ∞ → t s , uncertainty due to parameter estimation will 
vanish when the system reaches an equilibrium as t tends to infinity. 
However, the situation is different if there are substantial behavioral biases, characterized by the 
condition that  ∞ < = ∞ ∞ → s st t lim . Under this condition, true parameter values will never become 
known to market participants, and hence the condition  ∞ < ∞ s   introduces another kind of 
uncertainty to the price process. As a result of the cognitive bias, volatility can also arise from 
the uncertainty in the valuation-relevant parameter estimation. Proposition 2 below shows how 
market volatility will be affected by the presence of behavioral biases. 
Proposition 2. If we assume that behavioral biases are severe, i.e,. ∞ < = ∞ ∞ → s st t lim , the limiting 
variance of the 1-period return is given by  
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Proof: As t →∞,  ∞ + → s s i t  for all positive i. From (9), we have    20
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This completes the proof of the proposition. 
In Proposition 2, market volatility is decomposed into two parts: the volatility due to information 
uncertainty and the volatility arising from behavioral biases. Specifically, the volatility due to 
information uncertainty is given by  
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and the volatility attributable to behavioral biases is given by 
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It is interesting to compare the volatilities arising from these two different sources by computing 
their ratio. Dividing (11) by (10), the volatilities ratio is equal to 
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Expression (12) shows that the ratio depends on the mis-specified weights  s ' i ω . Since earnings 
announcements are usually made quarterly, the time period from t  to  1 t +   can be taken to 
represent one quarter of a year and hence r could be the discount rate for one quarter of a year.  
To have a better idea of the magnitude of this ratio, we consider the following special case: 
0 1 1 1 0 0 = = > = = = +     p p ω ω ω . Expression (12) then reduces to 
22
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Obviously, from this ratio, the percentage of excess volatility increases as  0 p  decreases. Since 
0 p  represents a bias coming from the “law of small numbers” (Tversky and Kahneman 1971), 
for this kind of bias, the small sample can be as small as 15 or 30, representing a horizon of 3.75 
to 7.5 years of data. If we assume a quarterly discount rate  2% r = , the volatility ratio 
equals () ( ) () ( )
83 . 8
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 when  0 30 p = . This result simply shows that the 
volatility attributable to cognitive bias can be much larger than the volatility attributable to 
information uncertainty. In fact, if the “law of small numbers” operates on a even  smaller scale, 
say, 15 0 = p , then the volatility ratio can be as large as 28.8.  
    Other than the magnitude of the excess volatility, we can make three interesting 
observations about excess volatility. 
Observation 1.      Excess volatility is a decreasing function of the discount rate or investor’s 
anticipated return r .   22
This observation follows trivially from (12) because the volatility ratio depends on 
r
r + 1
 which 
increases as r decreases. 
Observation 2.    Conservative  heuristics  will  reduce  excess  volatility.   
This observation follows from a simple computation of the partial derivative 
() () bias behavioral Var∞ ∂
∂
1 ω
, which ends up with a positive result. In other words, when  1 ω  
gets smaller, the excess volume becomes less. Since a smaller  1 ω  means that the investor is more 
conservative, the conservative heuristic actually reduces excess volatility. 
Observation 3.        Representative heuristics will increase excess volatility.  
This observation follows from a simple computation of the partial derivative 
() () bias behavioral Var
j
∞ ∂
∂
ω
 when  j  is large. It can be shown that the partial derivative is less 
than zero when j  is large. This means that when  j ω  decreases, excess volatility increases. In 
other words, greater representativeness contributes to an increase in excess volatility.  
4. MODELS’ IMPLICATIONS FOR UNDER- AND OVERREACTION 
4.1. Measures of Under- and Overreaction 
 Overreaction refers to the predictability of good (bad) future returns from bad (good) past 
performance, while underreaction refers to the predictability of good (bad) future returns from 
good (bad) past performance (DeBondt and Thaler 1985; LSV). In this paper,  we further 
investigate how investors’ cognitive biases affect the resulting prices of an asset in the hope of   23
explaining the underreaction and overreaction phenomena in stock markets. In many empirical 
studies, under- and overreaction are addressed in a portfolio context (DeBondt and Thaler 1985, 
1987, 1990; Jegadeesh and Titman 1993) in which winner and loser portfolios are constructed by 
picking the best and worst performers in the formation period, respectively. Underreaction and 
overreaction are then defined according to the subsequent performance of the winner and loser 
portfolios in the test period. In the literature, alternative approaches are also employed to study 
the under- and overreaction phenomena by examining the time series properties of the prices of a 
single asset. In the context of a single asset, under- and overreaction could be demonstrated 
either through return autocorrelations (DHS) or through the abnormal return under an event 
approach (BSV).  In this paper, both approaches are employed to illustrate the under- and 
overreaction phenomena documented by psychologists. Section IV.A.1 adopts a correlation 
approach and Section IV.A.2 deals with the same concept using an event approach. 
1. Under-and-overreaction in terms of correlation coefficients 
Consider the k-period return  k t t R + ,  from  time  t  to  time  tk +  and  the  k-period return, 
k t t t k t P P R − − − = ,  from time tk −  to time t. The correlation coefficient between these two returns 
can be interpreted as the lag-one autocorrelation of the k-period return. Since underreaction is 
associated with positive autocorrelation and overreaction is associated with negative 
autocorrelation, we define short-term underreaction and long-term overreaction as follows:  
(I).  Prices of a single asset exhibit a short-term underreaction (in terms of return correlation) if 
the k-period return has a positive lag-one autocorrelation for sufficiently small k. 
(II).  Prices of a single asset exhibit a long-term overreaction (in terms of return correlation) if 
the k-period return has a negative lag-one  autocorrelation for sufficiently large k.   24
We note that the above definition of under- and overreaction is consistent with the mean 
reversion phenomena reported by Fama and French (1988), who show that long-holding-period 
returns are significantly negatively serially correlated. Because of the existence of such negative 
serial correlation, a large percentage of the variance of large-horizon returns is predictable from 
past returns. This phenomenon is called mean reversion in the finance literature. Notice that the 
short-term underreaction and long-term overreaction as defined in (I) and (II) above are by no 
means mutually exclusive. Put differently,  1 K  and  2 K  can exist simultaneously so that the k-
period returns are positively autocorrelated for  1 kK <   and are negatively autocorrelated if 
2 kK > . 
2. Under-and-overreaction under an event approach 
 Analogous to the definition of underreaction and overreaction in terms of correlation 
coefficients at the start of the previous subsection, we now discuss an alternative way to measure 
under- and overreaction as in the event approach used by BSV. Under this approach, the market 
is said to have underreacted when the average return on the company’s stock in a period 
following an announcement of good news is higher than that in a period following an 
announcement of bad news. Quoting BSV, “The stock under-reacts to the good news, a mistake 
which is corrected in the following period, giving a higher return at that time.” However, when 
pieces of news come in continuing strings, the opposite phenomenon may occur. Put differently, 
the average return following a series of good news announcements turns out to be lower than that 
following a series of bad news announcements. This is described as the long-term overreaction 
phenomenon documented in psychology. To quantify such under- and overreaction in the sense 
used by BSV, we note that the earnings shock, t y , provides a measure of how good or bad the   25
earning is. Since the earnings shock  t y  follows a  ( )
2 ,σ µ N  distribution, a piece of good (bad) 
news can be viewed as one in which the earnings shock is larger (smaller) than  y s µ σ +  
( y s µ σ − ). Now consider the difference in average returns after a string of good or bad news and 
define ) , ( j s Ut  as follows: 
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     I n   ( 1 3 ) ,  j  represents the time length of the string of good or bad news,  0 s >  represents 
the intensity of the news content, and the quantity  ) , ( j s U t  represents the expected profit of a 
momentum trading strategy that dictates buying when there is a string of good news and selling 
when there is a string of bad news. If   ) , ( j s Ut  is positive, the momentum trading strategy is 
profitable resulting from a market underreaction. Otherwise, the contrarian trading strategy is 
profitable, signifying the existence of an overreaction. A formal definition of short-term 
underreaction and long-term overreaction can now be given as follows: 
(III). Prices exhibit a short-term underreaction if  0 ) , ( > j s Ut   for sufficiently small  j . 
(IV).   Prices exhibit a long-term overreaction if  0 ) , ( < j s Ut  for sufficiently large  j . 
Notice that the short-term underreaction and long-term overreaction as defined above are by no 
means mutually exclusive. Just like the existence of constants  1 K  and  2 K  in the previous section, 
constants  1 J  and  2 J  can both exist, so that  0 ) , ( > j s Ut  for  1 j J <  and  0 ) , ( < j s Ut  for  2 j J ≥ . 
4.2 Under- and-overreaction in the presence of behavioral biases   26
 In this Section, we assume that the representative investor possesses both conservative and 
representative heuristics and assigns weights to data as described by (C) in Section III. We will 
show in Proposition 3 that asset prices will exhibit underreaction in the short run and 
overreaction in the long run, where under- and overreaction is measured by return auto-
correlations. Proposition 3 is important because it shows that our behavioral model implies that 
returns are predictable, a well-documented market anomaly in the finance literature. In 
Proposition 3, predictability results even after the system has reached equilibrium and hence it 
does not arise only from the investors’ learning process. We then demonstrate short-term 
underreaction and long-term overreaction phenomena using an event approach in Proposition 4. 
Specifically, for both under- and overreaction, we further define in Section V what we mean by a 
“magnitude effect,” alternatively known as the second part of the under- or overreaction 
hypothesis. We then prove in Proposition 5 that when investors exhibit both types of behavioral 
biases, the under- and overreaction observed in Proposition 4 displays a “magnitude effect.” 
Proposition 3.  If investors possess both conservative and representative heuristics, then prices 
exhibit short-term underreaction and long-term overreaction in terms of return autocorrelations 
(see I and II in Section IV.A.1). Specifically, there exist positive integers  1 K  and  2 K  such that 
for sufficiently large t,  we have 
(i)   
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Furthermore, the correlation coefficients in (i) is non-trivial for sufficiently large t , i.e. 
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Proof: For simplicity, we deal only with the situation when  s i' ω  are eventually zero, i.e., we 
assume that  0 > i ω  for o ip > (for some  00 o p nm >>). Under this assumption, the wrongly 
specified weights are: 
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k  with  large  t , we have  ∞ + − = = = s s s s k t t k t  where 
0 2 1 p s ω ω ω + + + = ∞ …   is a constant.   
Since 1 ... tk t t tk NN y y ++ + −= + + , from (6) and (7), we can represent the k-period return, k t t R + , , in 
terms of the return shocks  i y ’s. Assuming that t is large, we have 
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where 
2
1
sr
r
C
+
= . Notice that since  0 = t ω  when  t   is large, the number of terms in the 
expression  , tt k R +  is bounded above when k  is fixed and  ∞ → t . Thus, Var ( ) k t t R + ,  tends to a 
positive constant when  ∞ → t .   28
 
From (14), we can easily show that 
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When  k   is small (say, 
2
0 n
k ≤ ), the terms  21 1 ,, kk k ω ωωω + − − …   are all positive. Hence, the 
second term in (15) is positive. Also, when t is large and k  is small (say,  )
2
0 0 n m
k
−
≤ , each 
product in the first term consists of factors of the same sign. This implies that the first term is 
non-negative. This establishes the existence of short-term underreaction. On the other hand, if 
0 p k > , since we assume  0 = t ω  when t is large, the first term in (15) is zero when k  is large 
(say,  0 kp > ). Also, if k  is large, the difference of two ω ’s in the second term are negative or 
zero. This establishes the existence of long-term overreaction. 
As explained in Section IV.A.2, under- and overreaction can also be treated using an event 
approach. Under this approach, under- and overreaction is measured by the expected momentum 
profit  ) , ( j s Ut   defined in (13). We will show in Proposition 4 below that when an investor 
possesses both types of behavioral biases,  ) , ( j s Ut  is positive when  j  is small and is negative 
when  j  is large. In other words, momentum trading is profitable on a short run of good or bad 
news but contrarian trading is profitable on a long-run of good or bad news. This signifies short-
term underreaction and long-term overreaction.   29
Proposition 4.  If investors possess both conservative and representative heuristics, prices 
exhibit short-term underreaction and long-term overreaction using an event approach (see III 
and IV in Section IV.A.2). Specifically, (i) there exist integers  1 J  and  2 J  such that for given 
0 s >  and for large t, we have 
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(ii) the expected momentum trading profit  ) , ( j s Ut  is non-trivial when t tends to infinity, i.e., 
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     We  first  state  a  lemma  from  which Proposition 3 follows naturally. 
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 in  which Z  represents a standard normal random variable with mean zero and unit standard 
deviation. 
Proof: From (8), and denote the return from period t to  1 t +  by  1 , 1 + + = t t t R R , we have 
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=  and  t z ’s are  (0,1) N  variables.  1 t R +  can now be expressed in terms of  t z ’s as 
follows: 
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Defining  () s D  as in (16), 
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This completes the proof of the lemma. Now we come to the proof of Proposition 4. Since 
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Since the conservative heuristic guarantees that 
0 2 1 n ω ω ω < < < … , ) , ( j t ∆  is positive for small 
values of  j . On the other hand, the representative heuristic imposes decreasing weights when  j  
is large. Also, under the assumption that  ∞ < = ∞
∞
= ∑ s
i
i
1
ω ,  0 j ω →  as  j →∞. As a consequence,   32
if  j  is large enough,  1 1 ω ω < + j  and the sign of  ) , ( j t ∆  becomes negative. This completes the 
proof of Proposition 4. Since the smallness of  1 + j ω   represents the degree of bias in the 
representative heuristic and the smallness of  1 ω  represents the degree of bias in the conservative 
heuristic, the proof above shows that the representative heuristic contributes to the contrarian 
profit, while the conservative heuristic contributes to the momentum profit. 
This proposition links investors’ irrational cognitive biases to financial anomalies of overreaction 
and underreaction. Empirically, overreaction and underreaction could arise in different kinds of 
environments. Overreaction occurs after long-run periods of good or bad performance, whereas 
underreaction happens after short-run periods of good or bad performance. These environments 
fit well with our proposition. In addition to demonstrating the existence of overreaction in the 
long run, Proposition 4 also provides good insights into how the contrarian/momentum profits 
arise. Since 
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2
1
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ω ω
σ   ,                      ( 1 7 )  
a contrarian trading strategy will derive a profit when  1 1 ω ω < + j  as t →∞. Note that a small  j ω  
signifies a heavy bias in representativeness and a small  1 ω  signifies a heavy bias in conservatism. 
Thus it is obvious that the representative heuristic has to overpower the conservative heuristic for 
a contrarian profit to surface. The long-run assumption is necessary for a contrarian profit 
because under a long-run situation the representativeness bias will become noticeable. On the 
other hand, the momentum profit when  j  is small arises from the conservative heuristic and the 
representative heuristic plays no role in determining the momentum profit.   33
Another interesting observation is that both momentum/contrarian profits are sensitive to the 
discount rate r . The smaller the discount rate, the larger the momentum/contrarian profits. This 
is because when r is small, future cash flows become important, and a mis-estimation of future 
cash flows will intensify the over- or underreaction phenomena. 
5.   MODEL’S IMPLICATIONS FOR THE MAGNITUDE EFFECT 
5.1   Existence of a magnitude effect 
In this Section, we will provide theoretical support for the second part of the under- and 
overreaction hypotheses. Recall that the first part of the overreaction (underreaction) hypothesis 
in DeBondt and Thaler (1985) (Jegadeesh and Titman 1993) is “extreme movements in stock 
prices will be followed by subsequent price movements in the opposite (same) direction” and the 
second part of the overreaction (underreaction) hypothesis is “the more extreme the initial price 
movement, the greater will be the subsequent adjustment.” Even though the empirical tests 
and/or theoretical explanations of the first part of the overreaction hypothesis have been heavily 
studied and uncovered by financial economists, the second part of the overreaction hypothesis is 
seldom systematically addressed by researchers. In this paper, we show that our quantitative 
behavioral model can provide theoretical support to the second part of the under- and 
overreaction hypotheses by showing that the magnitude effect exists under our behavioral 
specification. Recall that in the definition of   ) , ( j s Ut  in (13), 
{ } { } y j t y t t y j t y t t t s y s y R E s y s y R E j s U σ µ σ µ σ µ σ µ − > − > − + > + > = + − + + − + 1 1 1 1 , , , , ) , ( … … . 
) , ( j s Ut stands for the expected profit of the momentum trading strategy. Observe that both 
parameters s and  j  represent an “event magnitude.” For the parameter s, the larger is s, the   34
more extreme is the earnings shock, and the more extreme is the event under study. On the other 
hand, the parameter j  represents another dimension of “event magnitude.” If j  is large, the 
event consists of a bigger clustering of good or bad news and the event becomes more extreme as 
j  gets larger. Thus the “magnitude effect” associated with the under- or overreaction may have 
two meanings: 
(1) the momentum (contrarian) profit  ( ) ( ) ( ) j s U j s U t t , , −  increases as s increases, 
(2) the momentum (contrarian) profit  ( ) ( ) ( ) j s U j s U t t , , −  increases as  j  increases. 
We demonstrate that both magnitude effects exist in Propositions 5 and 6. 
Proposition 5   (a magnitude effect in s).  If investors possess both conservative and 
representative heuristics, both the long-term overreaction and the short-term underreaction 
established in Proposition 4 will exhibit a magnitude effect in s . In other words, both the 
momentum and contrarian strategies of trading on a string a good or bad news will have a profit 
that will increase with the magnitude of the impact of the news.  Specifically, there exist integers 
1 J  and  2 0 J >   such that 
(a)    for sufficiently small t, and for  1 J j ≤ , the momentum profit   (,) t Usj  is positive and is 
monotonically increasing with s; 
(b)  for sufficiently large t, and for  2 J j ≥ , the contrarian profit  ( ) j s Ut , −  is positive and is 
monotonically increasing with s.   35
Proof: From Lemma 1, we have 2
1
(,) 2 ( ) (,) () ty
r
Usj tj D s
r
σ
+
=∆ .Hence, 
2
1
(,) 2 (,) ' () ty
dr
Usj tj Ds
ds r
σ
+
=∆ . We will show that  0 ) ( ' > s D   suffices to demonstrate a 
magnitude effect in the under- or overreaction phenomenon (depending on the sign of  ) , ( j t ∆ ). 
The proof that  () Ds is monotonically increasing in s goes as follows:  
Conditional on  S Z > , Z  has a p.d.f  ( ) ( ) ( ) s x Φ − 1 / 4  for  s x > . Hence, 
                       () () ( )
() s
dx x x
s Z Z E s D
s
Φ −
∫
= > =
∞
1
ϕ
                      ( 1 8 )  
where  () ⋅ ϕ  and  () ⋅ Φ  are the pdf and cdf of Z . 
Differentiating, we have 
() = s D' () () ( ) () ( )
() ()
( ) ( ) ( ) [ ]
() ()
2 2
2
1 1
1
s
s s s s s
s
s s s s
Φ −
− + Φ
=
Φ −
− Φ − − ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ
. 
This expression is positive because  ( ) ( ) 0 > − + Φ s s s s ϕ . For a proof of this result, see Appendix 
2. This completes the proof of Proposition 4. 
Proposition 6   (a magnitude effect in j). 
(1)       When  j  is sufficiently large, the contrarian profit based on j  consecutive good or bad 
news increases as  j  increases.   36
(2)    When j  is sufficiently small, the momentum profit based on j  consecutive good or bad 
news increases as  j  decreases. 
Proof:    From the proof of Proposition 3, we have 
()
11
2
1
,2
j
ty
r
Us j
s r
ω ω
σ
+
∞
− +
→ . 
Since  1 j ω +  decreases  as  j   increases, the contrarian profit increases as j   increases and the 
momentum profit decreases as  j  increases. 
5.2 Convexity in the magnitude effect 
In Section IV.A, we demonstrate that there is a magnitude effect in the under-or-overreaction 
phenomena, in the sense that momentum/contrarian trading profit increases with the magnitude 
of the earnings shock. In this Section, we go one step further to show in Proposition 7 that when 
s is used as a magnitude measure, the magnitude effect is convex in nature. For example, when 
magnitude doubles, the momentum/contrarian trading profit is more than doubled. 
Proposition 7.   If investors possess both conservative and representative heuristics, the 
momentum/contrarian trading profit  ( ) , t Us j  is a convex function in s. 
Proof:  It suffices to show that  () s D  is a convex function in s. For a proof of this fact, see 
Appendix 3. 
For a plot of  () s D  versus s, see Figure 2 below.    37
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 2. Plot of D(s) versus s where D(s) is defined as 
() () s Z Z E s D > = and Z is a standard normal random variable 
 
 
6.   CONCLUDING REMARKS 
We posit that some investors possess conservative and/or representative heuristics that leads 
them to underweigh recent observations and/or underweigh past observations in the earnings 
shocks of stock prices. We introduce a quantitative pseudo-Bayesian approach to model such 
investors’ behavior.  
Compared with other behavioral models in which investors possess either conservative heuristics 
at one time or representative heuristics at another time but not both, our specification captures 
the essential feature of either conservative or representative biases in one parsimonious model 
that allows investors to possess conservative or representative heuristics at the same time.    38
This paper develops a model of weight assignments using a pseudo-Bayesian approach to reflect 
investors’ behavioral biases. In this parsimonious model of investors’ sentiment, weights induced 
by investors’ conservative and representative heuristics are assigned to observations of the 
earnings shocks of stock prices. Our behavioral model provides a quantitative link between some 
market anomalies and investors’ behavioral biases. While learning may contribute to market 
anomalies, anomalies still exist even after the learning process has been completed. In particular, 
we can deduce the following: (1) Excess market volatility will result from investors’ biased 
heuristics. The representative heuristic, rather than the conservative heuristic, contributes to 
excess volatility in the market. Excess volatility is more prominent when the discount rate is 
small. (2) Through a misapplication of Bayes’ rule, investors’ behavioral biases lead to short-
term underreaction and long-term overreaction in the markets. The more conservative/ 
representative the heuristic, the larger is the magnitude of the return auto-correlation. Further 
analysis shows that the representative heuristic contributes to the contrarian trading profit and the 
conservative heuristic contributes to the momentum profit. The smaller the discount rate, the 
larger the contrarian/momentum profit. (3) Investors’ behavioral biases induce a magnitude 
effect in the under- and overreaction phenomena documented in psychology, i.e., the more 
severe the earning shock, the larger the market autocorrelation and the larger the momentum/ 
contrarian trading profit. (4) The magnitude effect described in (3) is convex in nature.   39
 APPENDIX A: DERIVING THE BASIC VOLATILITY DUE TO 
INFORMATION UNCERTAINTY 
A Proof of the Property that   
2
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To compute the limiting value of t A , note that 
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where  B  is an upper bound on the weights  s ' i ω . Since the right-hand side tends to zero as 
∞ → t ,  0 lim =
∞ → t t A . This completes the proof of  ()
2
2 , lim y k t t t r
k
R Var σ = + ∞ → . 
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APPENDIX B: A PROOF ON MONOTONICITY 
A Proof of the Property that    0 ) ( ) ( > + − a a a a Φ ϕ . 
Proof: Since   
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 we have  () () 0 aa aa ϕ −+Φ > because the conditional expectation is obviously positive.   42
APPENDIX C: A PROOF ON CONVEXITY 
A Proof of the Property that    ''( ) 0 Da> . 
Since  () ( )
()
2
2
() 1 () ()
'( )
1( )
aa a a
Da
a
ϕϕ −− Φ −
=
−Φ
, 
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By the result in Appendix 2, the first term is positive for all a. For the second term, when  1 a > , 
it is positive because  a − 1  is negative. Thus, it follows that  0 ) ( " > a D  when  1 a > .   43
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